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Pennsylvania No-fault Act:
The Need for Interpretive Consistency
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether one embraces the dictates of the Pennsylvania No-fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act1 as friend or foe, the resounding pub-
lic impact of this promulgation demands the closest scrutiny of
members of the trial bar. In order to protect the interests of their
clients adequately, attorneys must possess an understanding of the
common law rights and duties involved in this area and demon-
strate an appreciation of the interface of the Act with insurance
contractual rights.' The revolutionary change in tort liability alone
demands that careful attention be given to developments which are
implicit in recent attempts at judicial construction and which pen-
etrate deeply into the fundamental aspects and implications of sec-
tion 301 of the Act. Any less comprehensive study would be sterile
and misleading.
The availability of punitive damages to the plaintiff injured
through the negligence of an intoxicated operator of a motor vehi-
cle is uncertain under the Act in light of the partial abolition of
tort liability.' Where the victim of such conduct fails to survive the
accident, concerned counsel also faces an uncertain road to recov-
ery in applying the No-fault Act to the Pennsylvania wrongful
death and survival action statutes.5 Any attempted discourse in
these areas requires a cognizance of the judicial interpretations
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.101-.701 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
2. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CON-
TmBp. PROB. 219 (1953); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BAsic PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
Vicrim 323 (1965).
3. Judge Cercone has noted the difficult nature of applying the No-fault Act. He
wrote:
At the outset, we caution anyone who embarks on the high seas of Pennsylvania's No-
Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act not do so without a good compass, a knowledge of
reefs and storms, and plenty of food and water. Any attempt to choose an alternate
route by land in an effort to unlock the secrets of the Act will encounter mazes of
paths, pitfalls, underbrush, and deadends.
Heffner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Pa. Super. 181, 184, 401 A.2d 1160, 1161, (1979), aff'd, 491
Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(1)-(6) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
5. See infra pt. IV.
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within the last five years that have subtly construed the Act, and
that have simultaneously created intense controversy concerning
the partial abolition of tort liability. An adequate discussion here
also demands an awareness of traditional notions pertaining to pu-
nitive damages.
While the Pennsylvania No-fault Act specifically rejected com-
plete abolition of tort remedy, the recent decisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court in Reimer v. Delisio' and Heffner v. Allstate
Insurance Co.7 demonstrate the uncertain extent of this abolition;
in the former, the superior court demanded that the claimant
point to the specific section of the Act preserving this tort cause of
action, while in the latter, the superior court inferred that preexist-
ing remedies available under the survival act and wrongful death
act remain intact unless literally excluded. Furthermore, the
Reimer mandate advances a belief that the purpose of puntive
damages, to provide deterrence to ill-chosen conduct, is not aided
within a framework served by mandatory insurance coverage. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming Hefiner (Pontius),8 de-
termined that survivors of a person fatally injured in a motor vehi-
cle accident are entitled to both survivor's loss and work loss bene-
fits. Subsequently, appellate court decisions have relied upon this
decision to permit recovery of work loss benefits by both survivors
and representatives to the decedent's estate without distinguishing
plaintiff's status as one or the other,' and in the process have pos-
sibly misapplied the rationale of the decision.
This comment will analyze the delicate problems raised by these
recent judicial trends, with particular emphasis on their effect on
future victims of intoxicated drivers who must turn to the No-fault
Act for recovery. Initially, this comment will examine the historical
development of the Act. Thereafter, the role of punitive damages,
and the judiciary's perception of their function in the no-fault
structure, will be considered. The corollary problem that may arise
when a victim dies as a result of his injuries and recovery of work
loss benefits is sought will also be addressed. Finally, this comment
will consider where these judicial trends may lead, with suggestions
toward resolving the conflicting interpretations of the Act.
6. 296 Pa. Super. 205, 442 A.2d 731 (1982).
7. 265 Pa. Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), aff'd, 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980).
8. 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980). See infra note 167 for an explanation of the con-
solidation of these cases.
9. See infra notes 216-58 and accompanying text.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE No-FAULT ACT
A. Challenge to the Common Law Tort System and the
Legislative Response
No-fault legislation is the result of a boom during the 1960's of
adversary litigation stemming from automobile accidents which
flooded an already swamped judicial system.'0 Consumer clamor
for legislative initiatives to provide significant improvements for
compensating victims demanded attention, as skepticism turned
into criticism concerning the common law tort recovery system,
which was castigated as slow and inefficient." Prior to 1971, the
Pennsylvania legislature remained diffident to this mounting pres-
sure, unable, or at least unwilling, to enbrace any complex solution
that could go beyond the common law modus into a fresher and
more efficient manner of recovery.'" Following pressure from Gov-
ernor Milton Shapp'5 and numerous legislative proposals, the pre-
sent act was signed into law on July 19, 1974, and became effective
on July 19, 1975.1"
The specified purpose of the Act is: "[T]o establish at reasonable
cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt
and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims
and survivors of deceased victims."'1 5 This is attempted by com-
pensating victims on a first-party basis, irrespective of fault,
through a compulsory insurance system in which the victim is paid
10. See, e.g., Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-Fault Auto Insurance, 54 MINN.
L. REV. 921 (1970); Vondra, A Revised Plan, 1969 INS. L.J. 7 (1969); NEw YORK INS. DEP'T,
"AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENErr?" (1970). See also W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM - AUTO COMPENSATION
PLANS (1965); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Re-
imbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967); Keeton, The Case for No-Fault Insurance, 44
Miss. L.J. 1 (1973). For an excellent source of a multitude of no-fault material, see W.
RoKgs, No-FAULT INSURANCE (1971). See also Berger, Compensation Plans for Personal In-
juries, U. ILL. L. FORUM 217 (1962).
11. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COM-
PENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1971) ("major shortcoming of the auto accident liabil-
ity system ... [is that] only those who can prove that others were at fault while they were
without fault in an accident have a legal right to recover their losses .... [Tihe coverage of
the present compensation mechanism is seriously deficient").
12. See L. SWARTZ, R. ANGINO, W. ARCHBOLD & J. QUINN, THE PENNSYLVANIA No-
FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT (D. Shrager ed. 1979 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Shrager].
13. See Shrager, supra note 12, at xxiii-iv.
14. Id. at xxiv.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See generally id. §
1009.102(a); Midboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342 (1981)
(the purpose of the No-fault Act is to compensate a victim for his injuries).
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by his own insurance company.'" These basic loss benefits 17 are
only available when the claim arises out of the maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle.18 This requisite nexus between the injuries sus-
tained and their causation essentially encompasses any situation in
which the claimant or decedent is located in a vehicle which is
moving,1e is situated in a vehicle parked for the purpose of using it
in some fashion,20 or, in certain circumstances, is present near a
vehicle.2
To effectuate the Act's specified purpose of providing quick and
adequate compensation to the accident victim,2" the Act discour-
ages any refusal to pay basic loss benefits or dilatory responses to
claims for benefits by imposing penalties on overdue payments. 3
The Act also seeks to protect a victim who is injured by an unin-
sured motorist.24 The assigned claims plan provides uninsured mo-
16. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan v. Insurance Comm'r of the Commonwealth,
54 Pa. Commw. 93, 99, 42 A.2d 25, 28 (1980).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) defines basic loss ben-
efits to include benefits specified to recompense the victim for net loss, not including bene-
fits for damage to property.
18. Id. § 1009.103 defines maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a "vehicle, includ-
ing, incident to maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from
it." Id. See, e.g., Samsel v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co., 295 Pa. Super. 188, 441 A.2d 412
(1982) (the operator of a motorcycle injured in a collision with an automobile covered under
the No-fault Act is not entitled to recover from the insurer of the auto); Dull v. Employers
Mut. Casualty Co., 278 Pa. Super. 567, 420 A.2d 688 (1980) (removal of a boat from the roof
of automobile is not included within maintenance and use of a motor vehicle); Monaghan v.
Pennsylvania Mfr's Ass'n Ins. Co., 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 32 (1980) (plaintiff struck by a car
operated by a mechanic while waiting for her vehicle to be repaired at a gas station may
recover benefits). See also Wagner v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 525 (1980);
Howe v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 214 (1978); Ash v. Commonwealth Realty Co.,
4 Pa. D. & C.3d 418 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Howe v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 214 (1978) (passenger in a
vehicle is a victim when struck by errant shot from hunter's rifle).
20. See, e.g., Eichelberger R.R. v. Warner, 290 Pa. Super. 269, 434 A.2d 747 (1981)
(policy issued in compliance with the No-fault Act covered death of decedent struck on the
side of the road when he had run out of gas and parked there).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Harrisburg Taxicab and Baggage Co., 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 786
(1976) (plaintiff assisting a friend from a taxicab entitled to no-fault benefits).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
23. See, e.g., Hayes v. Erie Ins. Exch., 493 Pa. 150, 425 A.2d 419 (1981) (where a no-
fault insurance carried unsuccessfully challenged a claim, insurer was liable for 18% interest
regardless of good faith by insurer; attorney's fees were not awarded since denial was made
in good faith). Accord Jolley v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 797 (1978); See also
Burnett v. Erie Ins. Co., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 793 (1979) (failure to provide written notice of
rejection of a claim for basic loss within 30 days after receipt of reasonable proof of the loss
is a factor in the imposition of costs and attorney's fees).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.108 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See, e.g., Tubner v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 Pa. Super. 38, 421 A.2d 392 (1980) (no-fault coverage
provided under assigned claims plan now includes uninsured motor coverage); General Acci-
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torist coverage ranging from the minimum floors specified in the
Insurance Code to a ceiling limit determined by the excess of ac-
tual damages suffered over the amount of no-fault insurance bene-
fits received. 0
The right of the victim to basic loss benefits is subject to certain
limitations.' Basic loss benefits include allowable expenses,'7 work
dent Group v. Doctorovitz, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 630 (1979) (an insurance company which had
paid benefits under assigned claims plan to a person injured in an accident involving an
uninsured automobile has subrogation rights against the owner of that vehicle). See also
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Keystone Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 1130 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968); Amaradio v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 276 Pa. Super. 189, 419 A.2d 159, appeal dismissed, 492 Pa. 293, 429
A.2d 868 (1980); Singer v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 274 Pa. Super. 359, 418 A.2d 446 (1980); Day
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 Pa. Super. 216, 396 A.2d 3 (1978); Webb v. United
Services Auto. Ass'n, 227 Pa. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974).
25. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 481 Pa. 130, 392 A.2d 281 (1978)
(statute governing uninsured motorist coverage mandates floor of minimum protection to be
afforded to owner or operator of motor vehicles within the state); Marchese v. Aetna Casu-
alty and Sur. Co., 284 Pa. Super. 579, 426 A.2d 646 (1981) (the purpose of the Uninsured
Motorist Act is to provide protection to innocent victims of irresponsible drivers, and the
statute requires a liberal construction to achieve legislative intent). See also Mitchell v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 281 Pa. Super. 452, 422 A.2d 556 (1980); Adelman v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 255 Pa. Super. 116, 386 A.2d 535 (1978). On the subject of "stacking,"
see Marchese v. Aetna Casualty Ins. Co., 284 Pa. Super 579, 426 A.2d 646 (1981)(in order to
protect innocent victims, a plaintiff injured by the negligence of an uninsured motorist may
stack uninsured motorist benefits where one policy covers two or more vehicles). The courts
have not conclusively determined whether an insured may stack work loss benefits in' order
to circumvent the $15,000 limitation. In Kirsch v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 532 F. Supp. 766
(W.D. Pa. 1982), the district court stated that the No-fault Act did not allow stacking of
work loss benefits where the insured had a single policy covering two vehicles. In Carey v.
Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the district court com-
mented that "we see no reason to believe that... stacking would not be allowed under the
No-fault Act." Id. at 1234 n.2. As the Act is construed in a more liberal manner in favor of
insureds, state courts will be faced with challenges to an insurer's refusal to stack first party
benefits. Recently, in Eget v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 Lehigh Legal Journal 123 (C.P.
Lehigh County, Pa. 1982), the stacking of work loss benefits was allowed up to the limit of
the no-fault liability as applied to each automobile. Contra Staples v. Hartford Ins. Co., No.
2654 Civil 1981 (C.P. Monroe County, Pa., filed Aug. 11, 1982) (since the purpose of the No-
fault Act is to assure every victim of a motor vehicle accident recovery of a reasonable
amount of work loss, replacement services, and survivor's loss, a victim is entitled to a maxi-
mum recovery of $15,000 for work loss benefits and is not entitled to additional security by
"stacking" another automobile policy that she had with the insurer).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.201 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Heffner, 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980) (survivors of person fatally injured are entitled
to both survivor's benefits and work loss benefits, with decedent's contribution of income
under survivor's loss recovery to be excluded from amount recoverable under work loss).
Accord Augustine v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 293 Pa. Super. 50, 437 A.2d 985
(1981).
27. Allowable expenses include the reasonable value or cost of reasonably needed ser-
vices and accommodations for: "(A) professional medical treatment and care; (B) emergency
health services; (C) medical and vocational rehabilitational services; (D) expenses directly
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loss payments,28 replacement services losses,29 survivor's loss, 0 fu-
neral expenses, 31 and other economic detriment.3 2 Under the Act,
the insurer is obligated to recompense the insured victim for all
medical bills and rehabilitation expenses, and for the first $15,000
of lost wages regardless of negligence on the part of anyone.3 3 In-
terestingly, habitual unemployment for an extended period of time
prior to the date of the accident does not automatically prevent a
victim from recovering work loss benefits.
3 4
Certain victims of motor vehicle accidents cannot receive no-
fault benefits and are termed ineligible claimants.33 For example,
an employee who is injured in the scope of his employment in con-
junction with the operation of a motor vehicle owned by his em-
related to funeral." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
28. Basically, work loss means loss of gross income. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103
(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). Section 202 of the Act limits this recovery to a total of $15,000.
Id. § 1009.202(b)(2).
29. Replacement services loss includes "expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining or-
dinary and necessary services in lieu of those the victim would have performed, not for'
income, but for the benefit of himself or his family, if he had not been injured." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). Section 202 of the Act limits recovery for
this category to $25 per day for a total of one year. Id. § 1009.202(c). See, e.g., Easton v.
Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 152 (1980) (an insured claiming benefits
for once-a-week replacement services for an aggregate period of one year is entitled to only
such services during the calendar year after her injuries were sustained and not to 365 once-
a-week benefits). See also Habecker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 445 A.2d 1222 (Pa. Super
1982)(insured is entitled to reimbursement for 365 days of replacement services, even when
service days occurred more than one year after her injuries).
30. Survivor's loss means the:
(A) loss of income of a deceased victim which would probably have been contributed
to a survivor or survivors, if such victim had not sustained the fatal injury; and
(B) expenses reasonably incurred by a survivor. . . in obtaining ordinary and neces-
sary services in lieu of those which the victim would have performed, not for income,
but for their benefit, if he had not sustained the fatal injury, reduced by expenses
* * * avoided by reason of the victim's death resulting from injury.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
31. Id. § 1009.103.
32. Id. §§ 1009.103, .207.
33. Troutman v. Tabb, 285 Pa. Super. 353, 427 A.2d 673 (1981).
.34. See Marryshow v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 172 (1979), aff'd,
452 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (the insurer liable for a victim's losses under no-fault is
also responsible for work loss benefits even if the victim has never been regularly employed).
Callahan v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 190 (1981)(no-fault does not auto-
matically prevent a victim from recovery of work loss benefits even if the victim had been
unemployed during the eight years preceding the accident).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.208(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See, e.g., Lyn-
garkos v. Department of Transp., 57 Pa. Commw. 121, 426 A.2d 1195 (1981) (where automo-
bile accident occurred outside of Pennsylvania, and neither the passenger nor the vehicle in
which he was injured was insured, and no other insured vehicles were involved, there was no
security from which the passenger could recover under the No-fault Act).
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ployer, cannot recover no-fault basic loss benefits, but must look to
his worker's compensation coverage.36 More importantly for this
discussion, a party who is intentionally injured by a motor vehicle
operator must recover in tort.
3 7
B. Section 301-A Fundamental Perspective
The most apparent change in all compensatory reorganization
plans for motor vehicle accident victims is demonstrated in each
plan's response to the aforementioned criticism of the common law
tort system, specifically its provisions affecting tort liability. This
inquiry concerning the availability of punitive damages for a vic-
tim injured by an intoxicated operator, and recovery of no-fault
work loss benefits for tortious death, requires a tentative review of
the expanse of the section 301 partial abolition of tort liability
prior to any formulation of answers to these specific issues. In or-
der to conduct this review, we must move from the bare skeletal
dictates of the statute as enacted to the fully embellished, powerful
weapon that this section, after judicial interpretation, now
represents.
No state has yet to enact a no-fault statute providing for the
total abrogation of the tort system and the elimination of general
damages. All state no-fault laws, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act,38 and the Keeton-O'Connell plan39 allow
some tort remedy. Some states have no-fault laws which either ex-
empt secured owners from tort liability,"' or which place the in-
sured victim under a disability to sue unless a serious injury results
or a threshold is crossed."1 Section 301(a) of the Pennsylvania Act
provides for the abolition of tort liability except under certain cir-
cumstances or unless certain parties are involved.42
The initial constitutional challenge to the no-fault scheme arose
36. See, e.g., Wagner v. National Indem. Co., 492 Pa. 154, 422 A.2d 1061 (1980) (where
an employee is injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle and is covered by worker's
compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act precludes recovery from employer under §
204(a)(4) of the No-fault Act and an employee must recover under worker's compensation).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1009.208(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
38. UNIF. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT § 5(b) (1972) [hereinafter cited
as UMVARA] reprinted in Shrager, supra note 12, at app. D.
39. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
40. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (West 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
90, § 34A, D, H, K, M, 0 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1 to -20 (West
1973).
41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 65B.14 (Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-1 to -
13.4 (Supp. 1982).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
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in Singer v. Sheppard,"' and concentrated its attack on the section
301(a) abolition of tort recovery."' The plaintiff argued that section
301(a) limited recoverable damages by eliminating general dam-
ages recoverable in many tort claims and violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution"5  and article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution'8 by establishing an unreasonable classification among
motor vehicle accident victims entitled to general damage recov-
ery. 7 The defendants countered, maintaining that the Act did not
place a fixed dollar limit on personal injury recovery and that the
State had the power to wholly abolish a cause of action without
constitutional offense.'8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania up-
held the constitutionality of the Act, essentially for the reasons ad-
vanced by the defendants, remarking that the abolition of tort re-
covery for pain and suffering in some cases was balanced by swift
payment of medical expense, loss of income, and other economic
losses for all victims.' 9 Similarly, other jurisdictions have deter-
mined provisions affecting tort recovery to be constitutional."
Section 301(a) exceptions to tort abolition for injuries arising out
of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle specify that:
(1) An owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident remains liable if, at
the time of the accident, the vehicle was not a secured vehicle.
(2) A person in the businss of designing, manufacturing, repairing, servicing,
or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles remains liable for injury arising out
of a defect in such motor vehicle ....
(3) An individual remains liable for intentionally injuring himself or another
individual.
43. 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
44. Id. at 391-92, 346 A.2d at 899.
45. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. Section 18 of article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in relevant part:
"[No Act of] the General Assembly shall limit the amount to be recovered for injuries re-
sulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property, and, in case of death from such
injuries, the right of action shall survive ...... PA. CONsT. art. III, § 18.
47. 464 Pa. at 393, 346 A.2d at 900.
48. Id. at 396 n.10, 346 A.2d at 901 n.10.
49. Id. at 407, 346 A.2d at 907. The court recognized that "the legislature has substi-
tuted, in the case of relatively minor accidents, the prompt and sure recovery of economic
loss for the delays and uncertain awards of the courts." Id. at 404, 346 A.2d at 904.
50. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
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(4) A person remains liable for loss which is not compensated because of
any limitation in accordance with section 202(a), (b), (c) or (d) of this act. A
person is not liable for loss which is not compensated because of limitations
in accordance with subsection (e) of section 202 of this act.
(5) A person remains liable for damages for non-economic detriment if the
accident results in:
(A) death or serious and permanent injury, or
(B) the reasonable value of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental services . . . exclusive of diagnostic x-ray costs and rehabilita-
tion costs in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) is in excess of seven
hundred fifty dollars ($750) . . . or
(C) medically determinable physical or mental impairment which pre-
vents the victim from performing all or substantially all of the mate-
rial acts and duties which constitute his usual and customary daily
activities and which continues for more than sixty consecutive days;
or
(D) injury which in whole or in part consists of cosmetic disfigurement
which is permanent, irreparable and severe.
(6) A person remains liable for injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident
to the extent that such injury is not covered by the basic loss benefits paya-
ble under this act, as described in section 103.51
The confusion that exists stems primarily from section 301 am-
biguities. These ambiguities may have resulted from the Act's ar-
duous journey to final passage. The Act borrowed many of its fea-
tures from the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act
5 2
and the proposed federal bill, S. 354."3 The Act also suffered exten-
sive legislative committee staff encounters and editing, and numer-
ous amendments resulted, arriving eventually at what has been
termed a "scissors and paste" approach." The amendments pri-
marily concerned the tort limitations contained in section 301; par-
ticularly the exceptions for maintenance of general damage
claims." The Shrager treatise notes that decisions interpreting the
Act's provisions began trickling out of trial courts in 1978 and
1979.56 This comment concerns recent decisions in two areas which
now enable an assessment of two issues left unresolved by the
Act's statutory language.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a) (Purdon Supp 1982-1983).
52. UMVARA, supra note 38.
53. S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 27,784-92 (1974).
54. See Shrager, supra note 12, at xxiv.
55. Id.
56. Id. at xxv.
1983
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III. RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM AN INTOXICATED
OPERATOR
A. In General
To determine whether a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated oper-
ator may recover punitive damages, examination of the statutory
exceptions is required to ascertain whether the type of conduct
from which punitive damages traditionally flow is preserved within
any of these enumerated categories. A general review of the subject
of punitive damages must be performed before a discussion of this
specific issue can be accomplished.
Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or
nominal damages, which are awarded against a person to punish
him for outrageous conduct.5 7 Generally, punitive damages are
given only when malice, fraud, oppression, or gross negligence is
present, with the first three of the mentioned conduct encompass-
ing a category characterized by malicious or evil intent.58 A plain-
tiff may recover punitive damages for malice, fraud and oppression
whenever the defendant's conduct evidences a formed design to in-
jure and oppress and not mere inadvertence.5 9 The last type of
conduct comprises those instances where a defendant is found to
have engaged in gross negligence.60 To be termed grossly negligent
for the purposes of punitive damages, the conduct must be so bla-
tant as to demonstrate the actor's conscious or criminal indiffer-
ence to the safety or rights of others." In sum, this sort of conduct
57. Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1979);
Bacica v. Board of Educ. 451 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super.
116, 423 A.2d 743 (1980) (to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must plead outrageous
conduct on the part of the defendant more serious than the underlying tort); Focht v.
Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970) (punitive damages are awarded against a
person to punish him for outrageous conduct and may be awarded when the act is done with
reckless indifference as well as bad motive).
58. See, e.g., Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Chambers v.
Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963).
59. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp.
231 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
60. Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1977) (negligence alone is not sufficient
for awarding punitive damages); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
61. Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super. 116, 423 A.2d 743 (1980)("outrageous conduct,"
which is required in order to recover punitive damages, is an act done with a bad motive or
with a reckless indifference to the interests of others; "reckless indifference" to the interests
of others or "wanton misconduct" consists of intentionally doing an act of an unreasonable
character, in disregard of a risk known to the actor or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow);
O'Neill v. Keystone Ins. Co., 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 600 (1979) (court stated that it would not, on
preliminary objection, hold that punitive damages were not recoverable for willful, inten-
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bears a more stringent burden of persuasion than the gross negli-
gence requisite for compensatory damages - an indifference to the
rights of others. Indeed, punitive damages are awarded to these
plaintiffs because of the defendant's extreme conduct standing
alone.62
Punitive damages are awarded to the plaintiff over and above
full compensation for his injuries for the purpose of punishing a
defendant, to teach a defendant to avoid this sort of conduct, and
to deter others from engaging in similar conduct.s3 These exem-
plary damages are awarded only in instances where the plaintiff
proves actual loss. 64 Generally, punitive damages bear a reasonable
ratio to the actual loss sustained and traditionally are permitted
only in tort actions.65 Pennsylvania has adopted section 908 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts." This section provides:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous con-
duct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights
of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly con-
sider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the
harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and
the wealth of the defendant.67
Traditionally, it has been extremely difficult to obtain punitive
tional, reckless and wanton disregard of insured's rights under the Act, commenting that in
view of the conflict in trial court decisions in this area, the matter should be settled by the
appellate courts or the legislature).
62. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 2 (4th ed. 1971); C. McCoR-
MICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
63. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND REcOVERY § 182 at 357 (1972) ("[p]unitive damages are
founded in the interest of society, and the award is in the nature of punishment for the
wrong-doer and as an example to deter the defendant and others from committing like of-
fenses in the future and are imposed as a civil penalty").
64. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973).
65. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)(punitive
damages must not be disproportionate to the amount of compensatory damages); Hamilton
v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(the Pennsylvania
statute providing that no insurance company shall make any misrepresentation as to the
term of the policy does not provide basis for claim by an insured for punitive damages for
failure of the insurer to make payments under the policy); Thomas v. American Cystoscope
Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976)(punitive damages may not be recovered ab-
sent a showing of actual damages and, if recovered, must bear reasonable relationship to the
amount of actual damages).
66. See Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977).
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damages in Pennsylvania." For example, punitive damages are not
generally recoverable in a fraud action 9 or in a contract action in
Pennsylvania.7 0  Acts of negligence alone are not sufficient for
awarding punitive damages.7 1 Also, under other states' various no-
fault statutes, an insurer's improper refusal to pay its insured
could result in an award of punitive damages.72 Pennsylvania has
not embraced this latter possibility for plaintiff's potential recov-
ery as rapidly.7
B. The Statutory Language
To determine whether a plaintiff may recover punitive damages
in an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent resulting from the defendant operator's intoxicated condition,
a review of the section 301(a) exceptions to the abolition of tort
liability is required. 4 Section 301 clearly demonstrates that there
are certain situations in which preexisting tort liability is abso-
lutely unaffected.7 5 This occurs when the threshold requirements
specified by section 301(a) are met.76 The No-fault Act permits re-
68. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978) ("punitive damages are not
a favorite of the law"); Annett v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
69. Golomb v. Krous, 261 Pa. Super. 344, 396 A.2d 430 (1978).
70. Culbreth v. Simone, 511 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(Pennsylvania law precluded
recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract); Batka v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 486 F.
Supp. 582, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980); DeLuca v. Fidelity Bank, 282*Pa. Super. 365, 422 A.2d 1159
(1980).
71. Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1977).
72. See, e.g., Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 451, 136 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1977); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970).
73. Hamilton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa.
1977)(punitive damages were not recoverable for insurer's refusal to pay insured on the
ground that the insured was no longer totally disabled as required by the policy for a con-
tinuation of disability benefits).
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Singer v. Shephard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975)(section 301 limited,
not totally abrogated, availability of tort remedies); Donnelly v. DeBourke, 280 Pa. Super.
486, 421 A.2d 826 (1980)(section 301 restricts the scope of defendant's liability in tort cause
of action). See also Teagle v. Hart, 279 Pa. Super. 487, 421 A.2d 304 (1980).
76. The term "threshold" refers to the statutory exceptions specified in § 301(a) which
must be demonstrated for a victim of a motor vehicle accident to be entitled to maintain a
suit based on traditional tort liability. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 189. See also Donnelly
v. DeBourke, 280 Pa. Super. 486, 421 A.2d 826 (1980)(the No-fault Act does not, however,
automatically require demonstration of attainment of threshold limits as a prerequisite for
filing a tort cause of action); Walk v. Russell, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 330 (1979)(plaintiff's com-
plaint must set forth facts which establish with reasonable certainty that future medical
services will exceed the threshold limits of $750 and in order to recover for non-economic
detriment, establish impairment of customary activities which are medically determinable).
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covery of all special damages which are not recoverable on a first-
party basis; that is, the amount of special damages in excess of the
statutory maximum economic loss benefits." Economic loss bene-
fits recovery is limited to work loss up to a monthly maximum of
$1,000 and an aggregate of $15,000,"8 funeral expenses up to a limit
of $1,500, 79 replacement services benefits payable up to a daily
maximum of $25 for an aggregate period of 365 days,80 and survi-
vor's loss up to a limit of $5,000.81
Section 301(a)(4) preserves liability for loss which is not com-
pensated due to basic loss benefit limitations.8 2 Section 202 lists
the basic loss benefits compensable on a first-party basis from the
injured insured's own insurer. Section 301(a)(4) then coordinates
the receipt of economic loss benefits within the first-party no-fault
system and the third-party tort recovery system when this thresh-
old is met.83 For example, medical expenses are not recoverable in
a tort action since they are recoverable without limit on a first-
party basis as a basic loss benefit and therefore the threshold can-
not be met." In order for a plaintiff injured by a drunken driver to
demonstrate a right to punitive damages via section 301(a)(4), he
must establish that he exceeds the threshold of recovery permitted
on a first-party basis; therefore, the plaintiff must initially estab-
77. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 14.
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.202(b)(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). This pertains to
recovery on a first-party basis under § 202 of the Act. To the extent not compensable under
the Act a claimant must maintain his action, if available, pursuant to § 301. The Shrager
treatise notes that "a tort claim for economic loss which otherwise may be maintained under
the law will have impressed against it deductible amounts measured by the same maximum
limits of no-fault benefits." Shrager, supra note 12, at 14.
79. Funeral expenses are a form of "allowable expense." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009-
103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). Allowable expenses are a recoverable form of basic loss bene-
fits. Id. § 1009.202(a).
80. Id. § 1009.202(c). Replacement services loss includes those "expenses reasonably
incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the victim would have
performed, not for income, but for the benefit of himself or his family, if he had not been
injured." Id. § 1009.103.
81. Id. § 1009.202(d); see id. § 1009.103.
82. Id. § 1009.301(a)(4).
83. The Shrager treatise states that.
A... common thread in the Act is the manner in which its provisions attempt to
coordinate the receipt of economic loss benefits both within the first-party no-fault
system and the third-party tort recovery system. In the latter instance... coordina-
tion works rather neatly. In general, when the Act otherwise applies, no-fault benefits
up to the statutory maximums may not be recovered in a tort case unless there is an
explicit black letter exception provided in the tort abrogation provisions of the law.
Shrager, supra note 12, at 3-4.
84. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 5, 14.
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lish that punitive damages are an accrued economic loss. The defi-
nitional section of the Act clearly indicates that allowable ex-
penses, work loss, replacement services loss and survivor's loss
cannot be expanded, even with the most liberal construction, to
include punitive damages.85
The threshold may also be met by demonstrations that the fac-
tual situation falls within the section 301(a) exceptions. The sec-
tion 301(a)(1) threshold is met when the plaintiff demonstrates
that the motor vehicle involved in the accident was not insured.86
Section 301(a)(2) recognizes tort liability when the injury arises
out of a defect in a motor vehicle and suit is brought against the
designer, manufacturer, or repairer, i.e., a products liability situa-
tion. 7 The section 301(a)(5) threshold is met when the accident
results in death or serious and permanent injury,8 physical or
mental impairment which prevents customary daily activities for
more than sixty consecutive days, 9 cosmetic disfugurement which
is permanent and severe,90 or reasonable and necessary medical
and dental services, the value of which is in excess of $750 exclu-
sive of diagnostic x-ray and rehabilitation costs in excess of $100.91
This section provides the threshold for general damage recovery,
termed as "non-economic detriment."' e9 While non-economic detri-
ment pertains to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, the Act's
definitional section declares that this "term does not include puni-
tive or exemplary damages." e Section 301(a)(6) pertains to motor-
cycle accidents."
Thus, the Act's literal language precludes any action for punitive
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
86. Id. § 1009.301(a)(1). This section declares that "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle in-
volved in an accident remains liable if, at the time of an accident, the vehicle was not a
secured vehicle." Id.
87. Id. § 1009.301(a)(2).
88. Id. § 1009.301(a)(5)(A).
89. Id. § 1009.301(a)(5)(C).
90. Id. § 1009.301(a)(5)(D).
91. Id. § 1009.301(a)(2)(B).
92. The Shrager treatise recognizes that "[g]eneral damages are styled in the No-fault
Act as 'non-economic detriment.' This term is defined in the law to include all of the ele-
ments of general damage recovery previously available with the exception of the punitive or
exemplary damages." Shrager, supra note 12, at 15.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(5)(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). Section 103 spe-
cifically states that noneconomic detriment means "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, and other nonpecuniary damage recoverable under the tort law applicable to
injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The term does not include
punitive or exemplary damages." Id. § 1009.103.
94. Id. § 1009.301(a)(6).
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damages based on section 301(a) exceptions because the would-be
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he has met the threshold. Ac-
cordingly, it may be argued that this potential element of recovery
has been abolished by the Act. To avoid such a result, a plaintiff
must rely on section 301(a)(3) to recover punitive damages against
the intoxicated operator who causes a vehicular collision. This sec-
tion preserves the tort liability of an individual who intentionally
injures himself or others.95 In Karpecik v. Houck," the defendant
was determined to have intentionally driven through a picket line
and into the plaintiff's back, injuring her. 7 The court permitted
recovery under section 301(a)(3) of punitive damages upon proof
that defendant intentionally injured her.9"
Other conduct cannot be so readily inserted within the parame-
ters of section 301(a)(3). In cases which arose prior to the effective
date of the Act, Pennsylvania courts permitted recovery of puni-
tive damages against intoxicated drivers for injury to others even
when malice or evil intent had not been proven. In Focht v.
Rabada,99 the superior court decided that driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, with its staggering potential for
harm and serious injury, demonstrates reckless indifference to the
interests of others and is outrageous conduct sufficient to allow the
imposition of punitive damages. 100 This language echoes the broad
discretion appearing in section 908 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts.10 1 The Focht court pointed out that the risk to others cre-
ated by the presence of a drunken driver may be so apparent and
the probability that harm will result from his operation of a motor
vehicle so unacceptably great, that the outrageous misconduct may
be established without reference to intent.102 That court relied on
section 500, comment (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and concluded that "if the conduct involves a high degree of
chance that serious harm will result [the] fact that he knows or has
95. Id. § 1009.301(a)(3).
96. 11 Pa. D & C.3d 622 (1979)(plaintiff's complaint demanding puntive damages in
an action to recovery injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident was deemed sufficient
where it alleged that the defendant operated his vehicle with knowledge that such injuries
were substantially certain to follow, which clearly evidences intentional conduct within the
meaning of § 301(a)(3) of the Act).
97. Id. at 623.
98. Id. at 624.
99. 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970).
100. Id. at 41-42, 268 A.2d at 166.
101. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
102. 217 Pa. Super. at 41, 268 A.2d at 161.
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reason to know that others are within the range of its effect, is
conclusive of his recklessness. '" 103 This language has been held to
encompass driving while intoxicated.10
4
The uncertainty in this area results from the interim between
the dates of decision for these cases imposing punitive damages on
intoxicated drivers and the date of the Act's enactment, 05 and the
conflicting results in lower courts.'06 Additionally, the Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court has not permitted the imposition of punitive
damages since the effective date of the Act for reckless or grossly
negligent conduct. Ostensibly, the prior right to recover punitive
damages against the drunken driver of a motor vehicle no longer
exists and any reliance on Focht or section 908 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is misplaced.
Any attempt to label intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle
and subsequent involvement in an accident resulting in injuries or
death as intentional injury of others for purposes of section
301(a)(3) is a tortured construction of that section. At best,
drunken driving is outrageous conduct rising to a status of gross
negligence with entirely separate duties and rights. Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue, a
few lower court decisions provide the slightest glimmer of hope for
our hypothetical plaintiff.10 7 Intermediate level appellate courts
have yet to accept any proposition suggesting that punitive dam-
ages are available for grossly negligent operation of motor vehicles
103. Id. at 39, 268 A.2d at 159 (emphasis in original). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Ov
TORTS § 500 comment d, (1965).
104. See Fugagli v. Camasi, 426 Pa. 1, 229 A.2d 735 (1967)(where the evidence indi-
cated that the defendant was operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor and travelling at a rate of speed of at least 90 miles an hour, defendant can be
found guilty of wanton misconduct).
105. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 219-22.
106. The trial court in Tcheou v. Weimer, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 243 (1980), stated:
We believe that section 301(b) of the Pennsylvania Act indicates the legislature's dis-
agreement with the position of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State laws that punitive damages should only by recoverable for purposely in-
flicted harm. . . . [W]e conclude that section 301. . . is an attempt to mold that Act
to specific public policies of the Commonwealth, to wit: the policy that punitive dam-
ages may be imposed on a tortfeasor who acts in a reckless and wanton manner as
well as intentionally. .. "
Id. at 249. See also J. STEIN, supra note 63, § 187 at 375 (1972)("Mixing driving and drink-
ing is also a frequent basis for the imposition of punitive damages. However, a claim for
exemplary damages on account of intoxication must usually be supported by some other
conduct that is grossly negligent .... The test seems to be the nature of the wrongful act,
rather than the fact of intoxication.").
107. See Karpecik v. Houck, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 622 (1979). See Shrager, supra note 12,
at 158 (Supp. 1983).
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or that intoxication represents intentional conduct for purposes of
section 301 tort abolition. Indeed, recently in Teagle v. Hart,'08 the
superior court rejected a plaintiff's contention that intentionally
injuring someone included an injury arising from gross negli-
gence.'0 9 The Teagle court concluded that allegations that the de-
fendants operated their vehicles in a wanton and reckless manner
and in complete disregard for plaintiff's personal feelings, well-be-
ing and safety, which resulted in injury and loss to plaintiff were
insufficient to state a case of action for punitive damages under the
No-fault Act in the absence of any assertion that the plaintiff had
been injured intentionally by the defendants.110 Interestingly, the
contentions advanced in the plaintiff's complaint, which were held
insufficient by the Teagle court, track the language of Focht v.
Rabada and sections 500 and 908 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts with unerring accuracy, and were obviously the result of a
recognition that these provisions were relied upon in cases in the
pre-no-fault era to award punitive damages for nonintentional con-
duct. As a result, it is clear that an averment of gross negligence is
an insufficient basis to structure a claim for punitive damages for
an injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
in the 1980's.
C. Judicial Clarification in the Area of Punitive Damages
In Reimer v. Delisio,"' the defendant-operator crossed the cen-
terline and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle while traveling in
excess of fifty miles per hour on a public street adjacent to a play-
ground." 2 The plaintiff suffered extensive permanent injuries."18
The plaintiff claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in deter-
mining that punitive damages were not recoverable for reckless or
willful conduct under the No-fault Act, asserting that punitive lia-
bility for gross negligence or recklessness could only be abolished
by use of language expressly denying any right to punitive
damages."'
The Reimer court affirmed the decision of the trial court with an
analysis exhibiting exquisite attention to the interaction of section
108. 279 Pa. Super. 487, 421 A.2d 304 (1980).
109. Id. at 490, 421 A.2d at 305.
110. Id.
111. 296 Pa. Super. 205, 442 A.2d 731 (1982).
112. Id. at 208, 442 A.2d at 732.
113. The plaintiff's left knee cap had to be surgically removed. Id.
114. Id. at 209, 442 A.2d at 733.
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103 definitions of loss and non-economic detriment,115 section 208
declaration of acts insufficient to constitute an intentional act,",
and section 301(a) threshold requirements."' Relying on the Act's
expressed purpose and its perception of problems then present in
the traditional tort system, the court concluded that section 301
abolished all tort actions arising within the Act's coverage, includ-
ing recovery of punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct, and
then recreated specifically enumerated and limited exceptions to
this abolition. 1 8 This construction is accurate because the Act pro-
vides for an abolition of tort liability, not a restriction on recovery.
While a statute formed with a restrictive lattice would demand a
clause expressly affecting punitive recovery, an abolition with enu-
merated preservations indicates an entirely different intent of the
General Assembly."'
Moreover, Reimer is supported by the additional fact that the
Act itself appears to inform claimants that reliance on the Focht
rationale is misplaced. Section 208(b), entitled "Intentional Inju-
ries," states in pertinent part: "An individual does not intention-
ally injure himself or another individual: (A) merely because his
act or failure to act is intentional or done with his realization that
it creates a grave risk of causing injury. '120 Assuredly, an intoxi-
cated operator reaches his impaired condition as a result of inten-
tionally consuming alcoholic beverages. But whether he appreci-
ates the risk that he might be involved in an accident while
motoring home, he does not drink with the intent of injuring
others later that evening."'
In Reimer v. Delisio, section 301(b) represented the plaintiff's
final stab at salvaging a right to recover punitive damages. 22 This
section creates a concept entitled a "Nonreimbursable tort fine,"
115. Id.
116. Id. at 210-13, 442 A.2d 733-34.
117. Id. at 210-17, 442 A.2d at 733-37.
118. Id. at 210-11, 442 A.2d at 733.
119. Shrager, supra note 12, at 190.
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.208(b)(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
121. Reporter Robert Stuart cites statistics indicating one of four drivers on the road
at 2 a.m. on any given day is intoxicated but continues to drive, commenting that
"[d]runken driving is ... considered humorous or, at the most, embarrassing sometimes,
'socially acceptable' most times, tragic only rarely and unforgivable hardly ever." The Pitts-
burgh Press, July 13, 1982, at 1, col. 4. See also J. STEIN, supra note 63 § 186 at 371 (1972):
"In most cases involving personal injuries, proving the defendant's malice would be difficult,
if not impossible. Obviously, most automobile drivers who become involved in accidents do
not intend to injure everyone." Id.
122. 296 Pa. Super. at 210, 442 A.2d at 734.
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which under the Act means that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to immunize an individual from
liability to pay a fine on the basis of fault in any proceeding based upon any
act or omission arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle:
Provided, That such fine may not be paid or reimbursed by an insurer or
other restoration obligor. m2
The Reimer court recognized the inherent ambiguity present in
this provision, especially since "tort fine" represents an unfamiliar
concept with no ready characterization.124 Judge Cercone,1 25 how-
ever, believed that the historically conceived definitions of punitive
damages were so precise and universally acknowledged that the
General Assembly could not have created a new term in section
301(b) to so ambiguously represent punitive damages, especially
since traditional wording was possible.12 6 He placed great emphasis
on federal congressional committee reports to conclude that the in-
tended meaning of "tort fine" in no way includes punitive
damages.
1 27
Reimer observed that various drafts of the National No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Act resulted in extensive committee dialogue per-
taining to the availability of punitive damages in actions arising
under no-fault systems. 128 One such report discussed the term
"tort fine" in depth and provided, in pertinent part:
The development of liability insurance . . . served to vitiate the deterrent
function of tort law as applied to the enforcement of safe driving require-
ments .... [T]o the extent that [a large tort] judgment is paid by his in-
surance company, the driver himself is neither punished nor deterred from
similar conduct in the future .... Any state . . . may maintain a motor
vehicle liability system based on fault so long as no insurer ... is permitted
to pay the 'fine' imposed in any such proceeding .... The term 'fine' does
not include a device in present law which has, at least in some states, a
similar purpose-punitive damages. No award of punitive damages may be
entered under Section 354 even in cases in which tort lawsuit liability is
preserved. The reason for this exclusion is in part because under some case-
law decision awards for punitive damages may be paid by liability insur-
ance, a practice which vitiates the purpose of a punitive damages
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(b)(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
124. 296 Pa. Super. at 205, 442 A.2d at 734.
125. Judge Watkins concurred in the result. 296 Pa. Super. at 222, 442 A.2d at 739
(Watkins, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 211, 442 A.2d at 734 (citing D. DosS, REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); C. MCCOR-
MIcK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 comment 2 (1977)).
127. 296 Pa. Super. at 212-15, 442 A.2d at 734-36.
128. Id. at 212, 442 A.2d at 734. See, e.g., UMVARA, supra note 38, § 5(b); the Na-
tional No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act, S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 210 (1973).
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judgment.'29
Additionally, Senator Magnuson, in a subsequent committee re-
port, specifically excepted punitive damages from 'fines' imposed
under the No-Fault Insurance Act.130 Review of this legislative his-
tory led Judge Cercone to conclude that the concept of a tort fine
is totally distinct from that of punitive damages."' Also, believing
the tort system to be a most unfair and insufficient means for com-
pensating victims of motor vehicle accidents, 32 he interpreted sec-
tion 301(a) as primarily seeking to aid victims of accidents by pro-
viding quick recompense to victims. 33 Implicitly, he deemed the
conduct of the negligent operator to be of no, or meager, concern
to the court.1
3 4
Judge Cercone was swift to point out that the Act did not jetti-
son a right to punitive damages in all situations, noting that this
remedy was still available when the defendant intentionally injures
another. 3 5 Accordingly, the superior court approved the lower
court's refusal to allow punitive damages when the plaintiff fails to
allege acts which do not constitute intentional conduct.
129. The Reimer court noted that the National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act, S. REP.
No. 328, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1973) specifically recognized that there is no great
promise for deterrence under a no-fault system. The Proposed Federal Act S. 354, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(2) (1973), provided an identically worded section for the abolition of
tort liability as the Pennsylvania Act. 296 Pa. Super. at 212-13, 442 A.2d at 734-35. See
Shrager, supra note 12, at 219-22.
130. The National Standards for No-Fault Insurance Act, S. REP. No. 283, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 90-91 (1975) is included in the Reimer decision at 296 Pa. Super. at 214-15, 442
A.2d at 735-36.
131. 296 Pa. Super. at 215-16, 442 A.2d at 736.
132. Id. at 209, 442 A.2d at 736. Many authors have recognized this belief. A study by
the United States Department of Transportation in 1971 concluded that:
Today, our society need not settle for a reparations system that deliberately excludes
large numbers of victims from its protection or gives clearly inadequate levels of pro-
tection to those who need it most. With only 45% of those killed or seriously injured
in auto accidents benefiting in any way from the tort liability insurance system, and
one out of every ten of such victims receiving nothing from any system of reparations,
the coverage of the present compensation mechanism is seriously deficient.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1971).
133. 296 Pa. Super. at 215-16, 442 A.2d at 736.
134. Id. The court utilized language from W. RoKs, No-FAULT INSURANCE 213 (1971),
stating:
The whole thrust of the evolution of automobile insurance, the emergence of financial
responsibility laws, and the clamor for no-fault systems, has been to focus on the
plight of the insured party in the automobile accident. Punishment of the guilty
driver is a secondary consideration and a minor one at that.
Id.
135. 296 Pa. Super. at 217, 442 A.2d at 737.
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Arguably, a plaintiff injured by a drunken driver may still aver
that defendant's conduct does constitute intentional conduct for
purpose of the No-fault Act because Reimer and Teagle did not
specifically involve a drunken driver, only a driver who operated
his vehicle in a reckless and grossly negligent fashion. As noted
earlier, however, pre-no-fault cases permitting recovery of punitive
damages against an intoxicated operator did so while characteriz-
ing defendant's conduct as grossly negligent and/or reckless. In
contrast, none deemed it intentional. For a court to characterize
this conduct as intentional would be extremely inconsistent in light
of judicial precedent and without sound basis. Such an analysis
would fly in the face of no-fault's foundation: examination and
compensation of the injured party without regard to fault with
only incidental focus on defendant's conduct.
IV. A COROLLARY PROBLEM: WHETHER AN ESTATE OF A
DECEDENT MAY RECOVER WORK Loss UNDER THE ACT
Statutory ambiguity and inconsistent judicial attempts to inter-
pret the Act have created an uncertain right to recovery which sur-
faces when the hypothetical plaintiff involved in an accident with
an intoxicated operator dies as a result of the mishap. The specific
question that remains unanswered is whether a decedent's estate is
considered a "survivor" under the Act and is thereby entitled to
work loss benefits. If not, then on what statutory justification can
such a recovery rest? Also, uncertainty envelops cases involving ac-
tions brought by the decedent's estate because the intermediate
courts insist on relying on the Heffner (Pontius) decision, a case
almost entirely concerned with recovery of work loss benefits by an
individual. Furthermore, a number of superior court cases expound
at length on the dependency requirement included in the Act's
definition of "survivor" when the plaintiff is actually the nonde-
pendent decedent's estate.
The controversy in this area stems from the judicial recognition
that "work loss ' ' 13s and "survivor's loss '"137 are independent basic
136. "Work loss" means:
(A) loss of gross income of a victim, as calculated pursuant to the provisions of
section 205 of this act; and
(B) reasonable expenses of a victim for hiring a substitute to perform self-em-
ployment services, thereby mitigating loss of income, or for hiring special help,
thereby enabling a victim to work and mitigate loss of income.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
137. Id. § 1009.103.
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loss benefits creating distinct categories of damages recoverable
following a fatal motor vehicle accident when there is no coherent
statutory basis for such a division in the No-fault Act's language.
Unfortunately, the judicial interpretations striving to permit recov-
ery of work loss benefits to plaintiffs suing as individuals and as
representatives of the decedent's estate on the theory that work
loss benefits are akin to Survival Act damages on a no-fault basis
and survivor's loss akin to Wrongful Death Act damages13 demon-
strate a mistaken reliance on pre-no-fault tort remedies, especially
when one recognizes that these same courts have declared that the
initial clause of section 301 of the Act explicitly abolished all
causes of action arising from the maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle."' Therefore, only those remedies expressed in the Act's
language exist for victims of a motor vehicle accident. For example,
the Act clearly provides for a situation where a wage loss is in-
curred by a surviving victim. 140 The Act doesn't ignore accidents
which result in fatalities; in fact, the Act defines "deceased vic-
tim. '141 The Act provides survivor's loss upon death; it is silent,
however, with regard to wage loss where the victim dies. The Supe-
rior Court and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have attempted to
clarify this issue with unfortunately ambiguous results.
1 42
Section 103 of the Pennsylvania No-fault Act defines "survivor's
loss. ' '143 The Act limits survivor's loss recoverable on a first-party
basis from the insured's carrier to $5,000.14 It also specifically de-
fines survivor to include a spouse, child, parent, brother, sister, or
relative dependent upon the deceased for support.14
At common law, a right of action for personal injuries did not
survive the death of the injured person, and an action for wrongful
death was created and permitted by statute in Pennsylvania.
1 4 6
138. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Nationwide Ins, Co., 532 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Dan-
iels v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 283 Pa. Super. 336, 423 A.2d 1284 (1980).
139. See, e.g., Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. at 211, 422 A.2d at 733 (1982). See
also Shrager, supra note 12, at 13.
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.205 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). A "victim" means
an individual who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Id.
§ 1009.103.
141. Id. § 1009.103.
142. See, e.g., Midboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342
(1981); Heffner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Pa. Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), aff'd, 491 Pa.
447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
144. Id. § 1009.202(d).
145. Id. § 1009.103.
146. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982).
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The common law principle of abatement of actions by death has
been abrogated by several statutes. 1 7 A survival action is distinct
from an action for wrongful death. In Pennsylvania, a survival ac-
tion compensates a decedent's estate for various categories of dam-
age sustained by the decedent and is not a new cause of action, but
rather is one which continues in his personal representative. 4 s A
wrongful death action is designed to remedy the economic impact
of the death upon certain statutorily enumerated persons. 4 9 One
of the means for fixing damages in a wrongful death action is the
detriment that the plaintiffs have suffered through the loss of the
deceased's future earnings.1 50 In a survival action, the estate is sub-
stituted for the decedent, and its recovery is based upon the rights
of action which were possessed by the decedent at his death.1
51
Work loss is not a consideration in a common law survival action.
A cause of action for wrongful death'"5 is possessed by certain
147. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3371 (Purdon 1971)(all causes of action or
proceedings, real or personal, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive the death of
the plaintiff).
148. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942).
149. Frazier v. Oil Chem. Co., 407 Pa. 78, 179 A.2d 202 (1962); Gaydos v. Domabyl,
301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930).
150. See Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963); Murray v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948). See also Hochrein v. United
States, 238 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1965); First Natl Bank of Meadville v. Niagara Therapy
Mfg. Corp., 229 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Pezzuli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d
659 (1942).
151. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963)(the estate may
recover for the loss of decedent's past and future earning power, for the decedent's pain and
suffering prior to death, and for the cost of medical services, and hospital care provided to
decedent); Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948).
152. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982) provides:
Death Action
(a) General rule - An action may be brought to recover damages for the death of an
individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of
another if no action for damages was brought by the injured individual during his
lifetime.
(b) Beneficiaries - Except as provided in subsection (d), the right of action created
by this section shall exist only for the benefit of the spouse, children or parents of the
deceased, whether or not citizens or residents of this Commonwealth or elsewhere.
The damages recovered shall be distributed to the beneficiaries in the proportion
they would take the personal estate of the decedent in the case of intestacy and with-
out liability to creditors of the deceased person under the statutes of this
Commonwealth.
(c) Special damages - The plaintiff in an action under subsection (a) shall be enti-
tled to recover, in addition to other damages, damages for reasonable hospital, nurs-
ing, medical, funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by the
reason of injuries causing death.
(d) Action by a personal representative - If no person is eligible under subsection
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specified relatives of the deceased who recover on their own behalf
and not as beneficiaries of the estate.' While these two actions
are distinct, confusion under the Act arises because certain dam-
ages for each action may arise from a common fund - the lost
earning power of the decedent."'
The No-fault Act provides that survivors of fatally injured vic-
tims are entitled to receive basic loss benefits."' Work loss is con-
sidered under the Act to be a special form of basic loss." 6 While
this would appear to be very straight forward and would enable a
survivor to recover work loss, a persuasive argument can be made
that the Act created two separate classes of accident victims, vic-
tims and deceased victims, and that deceased victims, as repre-
sented by their estate, are not entitled to work loss benefits."7
Support for this theory is derived from a literal reading of two
sections of the Act. Initially, section 103 differentiates between vic-
tims and deceased victims."' Arguably, the General Assembly
would have no reason for creating a "victim - deceased victim"
definitional dichotomy unless it intended to differentiate benefits
for surviving victims and survivors of deceased victims. Secondly,
article II of the Act enunciates the "right to benefits."'9 Section
201 within this article declares that "any victim or any survivor of
(b) to bring an action under this section, the personal representative of the deceased
may bring an action for the damages expressly specified in subsection (c).
153. Piacquadio v. Beaver Valley Service Co., 335 Pa. 183, 49 A.2d 406 (1946). See also
2 FELDMAN, PENNSYLVANIA TmAL GUIDE § 33.14 (1978).
154. One commentator has stated that:
Under the wrongful death statutes, the survivors recover for the injury to themselves
because of the death; under the survival statutes, the successors of the victim recover
for the injury to the victim.
Viewed from this standpoint, the two actions are quite independent of each
other, and there is no reason why both should not be maintained against the
tortfeasor. However, the difficulty is that the elements of the two injuries often over-
lap, so that unless care is taken to distinguish them, a double recovery for the same
injury is liable to result.
J. STEIN, supra note 63, § 265 at 598. See also Frankel v. Burke's Excavating, Inc., 223 F.
Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.201(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
156. Id. § 1009.202(b).
157. On one hand, if the victim survives, he is entitled to basic loss benefits including:
professional medical treatment and care, emergency health services, medical and vocational
rehabilitation services; work loss benefits and replacement services loss. Id. §§ 1009.202(b),
(c), (d), 1009.103. Alternatively, if the victim dies as a result of the accident, the survivor is
only entitled to survivor's loss and funeral expense. Id. §§ 1009.202(a), (d), 1009.103.
158. Id. § 1009.103.
159. Article II encompasses § 201 through § 209. Id. § 1009.201-.209.
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a deceased victim is entitled to receive basic loss benefits."' 60 Basic
loss benefits include work loss,' 6' however, there is no mention of
the estate as an entity entitled to recovery under section 201. If the
estate relies on section 301(a)(4) to recover in tort, defendant cer-
tainly will argue that the estate cannot recover since it has no right
to basic loss benefits, let alone the amount in excess of section 202
limitations, because it is not an entity specifically entitled to basic
loss under section 201. Basic loss benefits include survivor's loss,
162
and of course, a "survivor" could recover in tort for work loss not
compensated due to section 202 limitations under section
301(a) (4).
Thus, a dichotomy develops. At common law, a survival action
allowed the estate to substitute itself for the decedent, and any
claims available to the decedent were available to his estate. This
notion, applied to the Act, would suggest that the estate could re-
cover the basic loss benefits, including work loss, that are provided
to the decedent as a victim. However, the Act provides that one
must be a "survivor" of a "deceased victim" in order to recover
basic loss benefits, and does not include in its definition of survivor
the decedent's estate. There is no simplistic statutory directive for
an estate's recovery of work loss benefits. There exists, as a result
of recent judicial decisions permitting this recovery by a decedent's
estate, a statutory uncertainty.
Prior to the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior
Courts in Hefiner v. Allstate Insurance Co.113 and Pontius v.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,'" the Shrager treatise
noted that Pennsylvania courts had widely held that work loss
benefits were not recoverable on behalf of a decedent. 1 5 Under
this approach, it was argued that "work loss" provides for the re-
covery of loss of gross income for a victim, while "survivor's loss"
pays for the loss of income for a deceased victim. 66 The Heffner
(Pontius) supreme court opinion 117 however, has clearly rejected
160. Id. § 1009.201.
161. Id. § 1009.103.
162. Id. § 1009.202(d).
163. 265 Pa. Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), aff'd, 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 1629 (1980).
164. The superior court decided Pontius in an unreported opinion, based soley upon
its opinion in the Hefiner case. 491 Pa. at 449, 421 A.2d at 630. Heffner and Pontius were
companion cases at the supreme court level. Id. at 447, 421 A.2d at 629-30.
165. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 105.
166. Id. at 106-07.
167. For purposes of this analysis, the author refers to the supreme court's opinion for
these companion cases as the "Heffner (Pontius) opinion." The reader should realize that
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this theory, placing work loss benefits within the ambit of survival
action damages and, therefore, recoverable by a decedent's
estate.""8
In the superior court Heffner decision, Judge Cercone arrived at
this conclusion as the result of a three part analysis: reflection on
the purpose of the Act,16 9 construction of the Act's definitional sec-
tion,170 and specific reliance based upon the distinction between
the damages recoverable outside of the No-fault Act in a survival
action and those recoverable in a wrongful death action. 7 ' Judge
Cercone concluded that it was error for the Common Pleas Court
of Philadelphia to deny recovery for work loss benefits to the wife
of a deceased victim where the decedent would have been paid
work loss benefits had he lived,7 2 and stated that the insured sur-
vivor should be entitled to recovery.1
3
Allstate argued that the Act's definitional distinction between
victim and deceased victim created separate classes of victims and,
therefore, created separate classes of available recovery.' 74 The
court rejected the "victim/deceased victim dichotomy" because the
dichotomy ignored the impact of the Act's definition of "injury.
''
17
Section 103 specifies that "injury" describes "accidently sustained
bodily harm to an individual and that individual's illness, disease,
or death resulting therefrom.' 76 Because the Act specifically de-
fines the term "injury" for the purposes of construing the Act,
Judge Cercone decided that this word is a "term of art" and all
analysis must specifically adhere to the meaning given by the
the decision is entirely directed to the facts present in Heffner; that is, an action for work
loss benefits by a survivor, the victim's wife. Pontius was affirmed for unspecified reasons
and this analysis will focus on the appellate courts' mistaken reliance on the He finer (Pon-
tius) opinion for the proposition that an estate is also entitled to work loss benefits. The
plaintiff in Pontius was the decedent's estate.
168. 491 Pa. at 459-60, 421 A.2d at 636.
169. 265 Pa. Super. at 186-89, 401 A.2d at 1162-63. See The Statutory Construction
Act, 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1928(c) (Purdon 1978).
170. 265 Pa. Super. at 187-88, 401 A.2d at 1163.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 193, 401 A.2d at 1166.
173. Id. at 187-89, 401 A.2d a 1162-64. See, e.g., Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472
Pa. 66, 76 n.8, 371 A.2d 193, 198 n.8 (1977) (public interest in protection through auto insur-
ance contracts would be disserved by denial of recovery because insurance company received
the late notice of accident); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 395,
241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968) (liberal construction of uninsured motorist law to provide
protection).
174. 265 Pa. Super. at 185-86, 401 A.2d at 1161-62.
175. Id. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1163.
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
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Act.1  While admitting that the Act differentiated victims from
deceased victims, he pointed out that it did not differentiate inju-
ries from fatal injuries."7 8 While Allstate insisted that some sec-
tions of the Act applied only to non-fatal injuries, Judge Cercone
maintained that those sections were not so limited by their express
language.17' He supported this conclusion with special attention to
statutory construction, pointing to the Act's definition of loss as:
"accrued economic detriment resulting from injury . . . consisting
of, and limited to, allowable expense, work loss, replacement ser-
vices loss, and survivor's loss. ''180 Since injury means death, as well
as non-fatal injury, section 103, in Judge Cercone's view, must be
construed to mean that work loss is an accrued economic detri-
ment resulting from death.18s Judge Cercone found it inconceivable
that if the legislature intended to establish benefits for two differ-
ent classes, it would proceed in such an unclear fashion. 82
In terms of this definitional analysis, there is no major distinc-
tion between payments of loss benefits to victims or deceased vic-
tims if lost wages become due a victim/deceased victim when an
injury/fatal injury is suffered. In the case where the loss is the re-
sult of death, Judge Cercone stressed that the work loss is payable
to the decedent's estate, because the estate is the successor entity
to the individual as a victim. 8 3 Therefore, under the No-fault Act,
work loss operates as a partial replacement for damages in a sur-
vival action.'8 " When the superior court's Heffner opinion's various
references to survival action and wrongful death victim damages
are extracted and viewed successively, it is reasonable to argue that
the court decided that, in a case of a motor vehicle death, no-fault
work loss benefits must be paid to the decedent's estate because
177. 265 Pa. Super. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1163.
178. Id. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1163.
179. Id. at 188, 401 A.2d at 1163.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Judge Cercone listed numerous statutes promulgated by other states: COLO.
REV. STAT. § 10-4-706(1)(d)(II)(1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-319(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1982);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(b) (West Supp. 1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 698.070(5)
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4(b) (West 1973); N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(1)(c) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03 (21) (1978). 265 Pa. Super. at 188 n.19, 401
A.2d at 1163 n.19.
183. 265 Pa. Super. at 191-93, 401 A.2d at 1165.
184. Id. at 193, 401 A.2d at 1166. The court points out that this conclusion could have
been expressed with more apparency, directing the reader's attention to 17A GA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-3403b(b)(4) (1977), which specifically entitled survivors of a deceased victim to recover
work loss benefits. 265 Pa. Super. at 193, 401 A.2d at 1166.
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they are a form of survival action damages.18 5
Judge Cercone noted that in Pennsylvania, damages recoverable
in survival actions include the victim's probable lifetime earn-
ings '8 and in a wrongful death action, they include the present
value of the services the victim would have rendered to his family
had he lived. 8 7 He noted that a problem with Allstate's interpreta-
tion of the Act is that it would abolish the right of a deceased vic-
tim's estate to recover from a tortfeasor the earnings the deceased
victim would have contributed to his estate had he survived. 88 In
order to recover damages for lost earnings in a survival action
against a tortfeasor, the estate must prove that the damages have
exceeded the limits of the insurance coverage under section 202(b)
of the Act. 89 Under Allstate's construction, no decedent's estate
could ever have this opportunity because the estate would never
qualify for work loss benefits in the first place. 190 Furthermore, in-
surance carriers would contend that providing work loss benefits in
addition to survivor's loss benefits to the survivors of deceased vic-
tims would result in overlapping coverage and double payments.
The Shrager treatise disputes this notion:
[I]n the case of work loss, the Act is simply providing a certain measure of
survival act damage, on a no-fault basis .... With respect to so much of
[No-fault] survivor's loss recovery as represents contributions to survivors
this is simply no-fault wrongful death recovery. There is in fact no duplica-
tion of recovery."'
Judge Cercone recognized that, except as modified by the No-
fault Act, the preexisting substantive and procedural tort law re-
mains in effect, particularly as it applies to death actions. 192 Sec-
tion 301(a)(5) of the Act specifically exempts fatal accidents from
the general abolition of tort remedy for injuries resulting from the
maintenance or use of motor vehicles expressed in section
185. 265 Pa. Super. at 190-92, 401 A.2d at 1164-65.
186. Id. at 190, 401 A.2d at 1164. See Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191
A.2d 822 (1963); Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948).
187. 265 Pa. Super. at 190, 401 A.2d at 1164. See Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109,
161 A.2d 330 (1960); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930).
188. 265 Pa. Super. at 190-91, 401 A.2d at 1164. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa.
561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980) (evidence of future inflation and productivity increases must be
considered in determining lost future earning of deceased).
189. 265 Pa. Super. at 191, 401 A.2d at 1165.
190. Id.
191. See Shrager, supra note 12, at 112.
192. 265 Pa. Super. at 192, 401 A.2d at 1165. See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346
A.2d 897 (1975). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. This author disagrees with
this recognition. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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301(a).193 If Allstate's argument were to survive, Justice Cercone
stated that it would have to be concluded that the Act abolished
only one particular form of damages previously available in a sur-
vivor action - economic loss. 1 94 This is clearly contrary to the ini-
tial decision interpreting the No-fault Act. In Singer v. Shep-
pard,' 9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania realized that the
legislature sought to preserve all aspects of recovery for economic
losses and that the No-fault Act permits recovery without limita-
tion for proven economic loss.196
In addition, the Shrager treatise on the Pennsylvania No-fault
Act rejected the victim/deceased victim distinction, commenting:
It may be argued that the legislature intended that "deceased victim" would
merely be a sub-class of "victim" according to the definitions of the Act and
not a separate species of claimants to be treated differently. The legislature
specified that "deceased victim means a victim," while it states that "victim
means an individual." Surely, if the legislature had intended to separate
"victim" and "deceased victim," it would have placed "deceased victim" in
its own category in the definitional section (Section 103) in alphabetical or-
der and then it could readily have stated "a deceased victim is an
individual."
Even in the definition of "survivor's loss," the legislature treats a deceased
victim merely as another category of victim. In fact, the terms are used al-
most interchangeably in Section 103.11"
Additional support for the above conclusions is found in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's view in the Heffner (Pontius)1
opinion authored by Justice Nix, where the supreme court affirmed
the analysis of Judge Cercone and simultaneoulsy decided that the
wife in Heffner and the decedent's estate in Pontius could recover
work loss benefits. The plaintiff in Pontius was the administrator
of the estate of his daughter, who had been killed in an automobile
accident. 99 The defendant insurer paid survivor's loss benefits
pursuant to section 202 of the Act but rejected the estate's claim
for work loss benefits under the Act.200 The Court of Common
Pleas of Dauphin County sustained the defendant's preliminary
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
194. 265 Pa. Super. at 192, 401 A.2d at 1165.
195. 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
196. Id. at 396, 346 A.2d at 901.
197. Shrager, supra note 12, at 109-10 (emphasis in original).
198. 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980). See supra note 167 for an explanation of the
history of these companion cases.




objections in the nature of a demurrer to the complaint. 0 1 The su-
perior court reversed in an unreported opinion, based solely upon
its opinion in the Heffner case.20 2 The defendant appealed, and the
case was consolidated for argument to the supreme court with that
of Heffner.20 3 The supreme court affirmed in the Hefiner (Pontius)
opinion, but did so without specifically directing its rationale to
the crucial issues in Pontius. The supreme court rejected the the-
ory of a deceased victim/victim dichotomy, relying in part on the
presence of several non-Pennsylvania statutes where the legislature
clearly denied work loss benefits to survivors of deceased vic-
tims. 20 4 The court decided that "[i]f our legislature had intended
to establish different benefits for victims and survivors of deceased
victims under the Act, it would have done so in an equally clear
and lucid fashion.
20 5
The result of the Heffner (Pontius) supreme court holding is
that no-fault work loss is akin to survivor action benefits while sur-
vivor's loss benefits correspond to wrongful death benefits payable
to certain statutory family members. Implicit in a determination
that work loss corresponds to Survivor Act benefits is the conclu-
sion that these benefits, if available at all, are recoverable by dece-
dent's estate.20 6 However, the Heffner (Pontius) supreme court de-
cision permitted the plaintiff in Heffner to recover in her
individual capacity, i.e., as a survivor.2 7 To add to the confusion,
the Hefiner (Pontius) supreme court inferentially permitted the
decedent's estate in Pontius to also recover these work loss bene-
fits.2 0 8 The Heffner aspect of the holding, that a survivor may re-
cover work loss benefits, necessitates the conclusion that this right
is created by the Act and therefore work loss benefits must be a
form of survivor's loss. 20 9 With this in mind, for the estate in Pon-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 449, 421 A.2d at 630.
203. Id. at 450, 421 A.2d at 630-31.
204. Justice Nix listed laws of other states denying work loss benefits recovery to sur-
vivors: COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-706(1)(d)(II)(1974)(Colorado's No-fault Act expressly states
that "disability benefits ...shall not accrue following the death of the injured person");
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-319 (b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1982) ("work loss does not include any loss after
the death of an injured person"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 698.070(5)(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:6A-4(b) (West 1973); N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26-41-03(21)(1978). 491 Pa. at 457, 421 A.2d at 434.
205. 491 Pa. at 457, 421 A.2d at 634-35.
206. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
208. 491 Pa. at 448, 421 A.2d at 630.
209. This conclusion is derived from the recognition that the rights of survivors to
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tius to recover work loss benefits, the supreme court must have
concluded that a decedent's estate is a no-fault survivor. Both con-
clusions cannot stand together. Survivors are very clearly listed by
the Act. 10 An estate is not included. Alternatively, if the recovery
as a survivor stems from a conclusion that work loss is a form of
survivor's loss, an estate cannot recover because the Act specifies
that only a "victim or any survivor of a deceased victim is entitled
to receive basic loss benefits."'
Other aspects of the Heffner superior court and Heffner (Pon-
tius) supreme court decisions add to the confusion, in that there
are repeated statements to the effect that these survival action lost
wage damages are payable to "survivors" of the deceased.11 2 This is
particularly misleading because it is stated in other places that
these damages are payable to the decedent's estate.1 3 When a de-
cedent has no survivors, this ambiguous language will assuredly re-
sult in situations where insurance companies will refuse to pay
work loss benefits on the basis that the Heffner aspect requires
that they be paid to survivors as defined by the No-fault Act,
rather than to the estate, taking the position that the deceased
lacked any survivors as defined by the Act. The supreme court de-
cision in Heffner (Pontius) established that survivors of deceased
victims are entitled to recover work loss benefits.'" Unfortunately,
the supreme court in the decision failed to resolve the issue of
whether a decedent's estate is a survivor and, therefore, entitled to
recover work loss benefits. 15
The superior court in Freeze v. Donegal Mutual Insurance
Co.'26 sought to eliminate this muddled aspect of the Act.2 1 7 In-
deed, the Freeze court unequivocably arrived at a decision that the
estate is entitled to recover work loss benefits. 21 8 However, this po-
recovery damages is specifically enunciated in § 103 of the Act. Any other conclusion would
demand finding that the courts have legislatively supplemented the statutory remedy. See
supra notes 30, 137 and accompanying text.
210. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
211. Id. § 1009.201(a).
212. 265 Pa. Super. at 184, 401 A.2d at 1161; 491 Pa. at 459-60, 421 A.2d at 636.
213. 265 Pa. Super. at 191, 401 A.2d at 1164-65.
214. 491 Pa. at 460, 421 A.2d at 636.
215. Id.
216. 447 A.2d 999 (Pa. Super 1982).
217. Judge Hester noted that the supreme court's opinions in Heffner (Pontius) "con-
cerned only the effort of the spouse of the deceased victim to collect work loss benefits. His
[the decedent's] estate was not a party." Id. at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1004. The representative of the estate of the deceased victim sought to
recover work loss benefits under the No-fault Act. The Court of Common Pleas of York
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sition is extremely susceptible to analytical attack. In the Freeze
case, the decedent was an eleven year old male.2 19 The decedent's
father brought this action against the no-fault carrier on the family
automobile as representative of the estate . 2  The no-fault insurer
provided funeral benefits due under the insurance policy, but re-
fused to pay work loss benefits.2 2 The carrier argued that a dece-
dent's estate is not allowed to recover work loss benefits, asserting
that work loss benefits may be recovered only by the statutorily
defined class of survivors.222 Also, the carrier maintained that any
attempt to ascertain the amount of future loss incurred due to the
loss of a child demanded unacceptable speculation.22
The trial court utilized the basic character of survival statutes,
noting that the plaintiff, as representative of his son's estate, as-
sumes the role of the deceased victim, and accordingly denied re-
covery of work loss benefits on the basis that an estate is not a no-
fault statutory survivor.22' On appeal, the superior court empha-
sized that the Hefiner (Pontius) supreme court decision, while not
directly addressing the question whether a deceased victim's estate
may recover work loss benefits under the No-fault Act, affirmed
the Pontius aspect where the plaintiff was the administrator of the
decedent's estate.225 The Freeze court inferred that the Hefiner
(Pontius) supreme court affirmed sub silentio the superior court's
decision in Pontius, allowing a deceased victim's estate to recover
under the Act.2 2 Perhaps this is a correct holding. However, the
superior court relied on this naked dictim and did not advance any
justification for adding the decedent's estate to section 103 survi-
vors entitled to survivor's benefits.2 2 The superior court provided
County sustained the insurer's preliminary objections, but granted leave to amend. By
agreement of counsel, the original argument in the case was stayed pending the decision in
Heffner (Pontius). Id. at 1001.
219. Id. at 1001.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) specifies that
survivors include "(A) spouse; or (B) child, parent, brother, sister or relative dependent
upon the deceased for support."
223. 447 A.2d at 1001.
224. Id. at 1002.
225. Id. at 1004.
226. Id.
227. Id. The Freeze superior court also did not state that survivors alone are entitled
to work loss benefits. Therefore, this author suggests that the superior court has relied on
the Heffner (Pontius) supreme court opinion as a basis for granting recovery of work loss
benefits to an estate, but ignores the one clear aspect of Hefiner (Pontius); that work loss
benefits are recoverable by a survivor. These are incompatible aims. See supra notes 226-
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no rationale in relying on a supreme court decision which does not
specifically address the question of recovery of work loss benefits
by a decedent's estate.
Shortly after the Freeze decision, the superior court drafted a
similarly confusing analysis in Chester v. Government Employees
Insurance Co. 228 In Chester, the plaintiff brought suit as adminis-
trator of the decedent's estate.129 First, the Chester court230 de-
clared that the estate was entitled to work loss benefits on the ba-
sis of its holding in Freeze.2 3 ' Then, with striking inconsistency,
the Chester superior court engaged in lengthy analysis determining
that a mother need not establish dependency to demonstrate enti-
tlement to survivor's loss benefits and awarded survivor loss bene-
fits to the plaintiff, ignoring the fact that they had based the first
part of their opinion on the status of the plaintiff as a respresenta-
tive of the decedent's estate.1
3 2
While the second portion of the opinion interpreting the defini-
tion of survivor manifests correct statutory construction, s3 the
Chester court ignored the fact that the plaintiff in this instance
brought suit as administrator for the decedent's estate.2 34 Note
that Freeze involved a father's action as administrator and no
231 and accompanying text.
228. 448 A.2d 1080 (Pa. Super. 1982).
229. Id. at 1081. In Chester, the decedent's mother, as administrator of the estate of
an unwed physician killed in an automobile accident, brought an action to recover work loss
benefits and survivor's loss benefits. The trial court denied recovery, declaring that the
plaintiff failed to establish dependency upon her son for support. Id.
230. In both Chester and Freeze, the same six superior court judges rostered the ma-
jority: President Judge Cercone, and Judges Cavanaugh, Wickersham, Beck, Montemuro,
and Popovich. Judge Hester dissented in each case.
231. 448 A.2d at 1081. The Freeze court wrote: "[w]e hold today that the estate of a
deceased victim is entitled to recover work loss benefits under the No-fault Act." 447 A.2d
at 1004.
232. 448 A.2d at 1084-85.
233. Id. at 1083. Judge Cercone utilized the "last antecedent rule" to interpret the §
103 definition of survivor. Id. Accordingly, he read "dependent" as modifying "relative"
alone, and not child, parent, brother, and sister. Id. BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY defines the
"last antecedent rule" as follows:
A canon of statutory construction that relative or qualifying words or phrases are to
be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding, and as not extending to or
including other words, phrases, or clauses more remote, unless such extension or in-
clusion is clearly required by the intent and meaning of the context, or disclosed by
an examination of the entire act.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979). See Buntz v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 136 Pa.
Super. 284, 7 A.2d 93 (1939). See also Midboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 495 Pa.
348, 433 A.2d 1342 (1981).
234. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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mention of dependency was present.2 35 This anomaly unfortunately
places insurance carriers in a position where they must pay both
work loss benefits and survivor's loss benefits to an estate, as in
Chesler.20 The insurer cannot rely on the literal language of the
statute defining survivors2 37 and specifying the right to benefits3 s
due to the Freeze and Chesler decisions which supplement Heffner
(Pontius) and create the remarkable result that both decedent's
estates and survivors are entitled to work loss benefits.2 3  Such an
evolution of the No-fault Act is supported neither by the Act's lan-
guage nor by existing Wrongful Death and Survival Acts. The ben-
eficiary is in the envious situation where he may sue for work loss
benefits by bringing either a survivor's action in his individual ca-
pacity or as a representative for the decedent's estate.24
Judge Hester dissented in the Freeze and Chesler decisions. 4
In both decisions, Judge Hester noted that the majority failed to
distinguish between the plaintiff as a parent of the deceased vic-
tim, and the parent as an administrator of his estate. 42 He termed
any discussion of dependency irrelevant to the action because the
estate, rather than the mother, is the plaintiff.2 4 Judge Hester
found it inconceivable that the majority ignored something as ob-
vious as the distinction in bringing suit as an individual as opposed
235. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
236. 448 A.2d 1080 (Pa. Super. 1982). After concluding that an estate can collect work
loss benefits, the superior court determined that the appellant, here the decedent's estate, is
also entitled to survivor's loss, even though mentioned nowhere in the statutory definition of
survivor. Id. at 1081-82. The Chesler court's interpretation of the Act is astonishingly inac-
curate. For a more coherent approach, see Judge Hester's dissents, analyzed in this com-
ment at supra note 241-49 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 222.
238. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.201(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1983).
239. See the majority's opinion in Freeze, where this result is clearly prescribed. 447
A.2d at 1004.
240. See, e.g., Miller v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 452 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super.
1982). In this case, the administrator of the decedent's estates sought payment of "work loss
benefits" pursuant to the No-fault Act. The insurer refused payment of the claim on the
theory that work loss benefits are payable only to spouses or dependent relatives of de-
ceased victims. The lower court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment on this
basis. The plaintiff asserted that "all deceased victims are entitled to recover work loss ben-
efits regardless of who asserts the claim." To demonstrate the ambiguity of the Act's lan-
guage, Judge Popovich commented that an equal number of Pennsylvania courts had em-
braced both positions. This court reversed, declaring that "in the case of a deceased victim
the work loss claim is comparable to a survival action and the survivor's loss claim is compa-
rable to a wrongful death action." Judge Popovich continued, "in a survival action the dam-
ages are measured by the pecuniary loss to decedent and therefore accrue to his estate." Id.
241. 448 A.2d at 1085 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1005 (Hester, J., dissenting).
242. 448 A.2d at 1085 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
243. 448 A.2d at 1085 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
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to as a representative of the estate. '44 He noted that the legislature
excluded an estate from the definition of survivor,4 5 therefore,
under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius2"4 an
estate cannot be considered a survivor. 47 Judge Hester pointed out
that the General Assembly sought to provide "the maximum feasi-
ble restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the
economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor
vehicle accidents1148 and, therefore, a claimant must be a survivor
as defined by the Act to recover work loss benefits. 49 This writer
must agree. The majority advances little justification for their
Freeze decision. While relying on the Heffner (Pontius) decision,
the majority fails to support its decision in Freeze, or express its
reasons for determining Chesler on a separate basis. This type of
decision making evokes considerable inconcistency and little sup-
port and it can only result in future litigation. Indicative of this, is
the fact that on remand, in Pontius v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co.,2 50 the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas de-
cided that the Heffner (Pontius) opinion did not stand for the pro-
position that an estate may collect work loss benefits. 25' Further-
more, the superior court, in Miller v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co.,2 52 declared work loss benefits to be a separate form
of recovery and not survivor's loss benefits as defined by the Act,
and accordingly allowed the estate to recover work loss benefits
without a showing of dependency.53 Conversely, the superior court
244. 448 A.2d at 1085 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
245. 448 A.2d at 1085 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
246. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines this term as follows:
A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. . . . When certain persons or things are specified in a law, con-
tract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred.
Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to
specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
247. See supra note 245.
248. 448 A.2d at 1086 (Hester, J., dissenting) (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1009.102 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983)). Judge Hester conceded that the majority interpreted
the dependency requirement expressed in the definition of survivor correctly; however, he
declared that dependency was not the issue, but rather whether the estate of a deceased
victim, by statute, can collect survivors loss benefits under the Act. 448 A.2d at 1086 (Hes-
ter, J., dissenting).
249. 448 A.2d at 1086 (Hester, J., dissenting); 447 A.2d at 1009 (Hester, J., dissenting).
250. 102 Dauphin County Reports 432 (C.P. Dauphin County, Pa. 1981).
251. Id. at 433-34.
252. 452 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. 1982).
253. Id.
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in Wingeart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2"
determined that the decedent's estate was a survivor and entitled
to work loss benefits as such .255 The district court in Kirsch v. Na-
tionwide Insurance Co., 256 utilized a third distinct basis for per-
mitting recovery of work loss benefits by a decedent's estate. 57
The Kirsch court determined that work loss benefits were not lim-
ited to statutory survivors, and on that basis allowed recovery.258
These varying rationales illustrate that the Heffner (Pontius) and
Freeze decisions have not produced a consistent rationale for enti-
tlement to work loss benefits under the No-fault Act. What we
must seek, as demanded by Judge Hester, is a thorough legal anal-
ysis directly addressed to the distinction existing when suit is
brought by the decedent's estate and when the action is brought in
an individual capacity as a survivor. The current fundamental
oversight results in unmanageable problems for insurance carriers
in construing their no-fault obligations.
A recognition of the remaining confusion in this area is de-
manded when these cases are reviewed in a capsule. The He finer
decision granted recovery of work loss benefits by an individual su-
ing as a survivor of the decedent.2 5' Work loss type benefits prior
to the No-fault Act were only recoverable by a decedent's estate in
a survival action.26 0 Therefore, it must be assumed that the Heff-
ner court found the right of a survivor to work loss benefits within
the Act's parameters."' Inferentially, work loss benefits are a form
of survivor's loss benefits. "2  Because the Heffner (Pontius) su-
254. 449 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. 1982).
255. Id. at 41.
256. 532 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
257. Id. at 768.
258. Id. The Kirsch court initially framed the issue before it as "whether these bene-
fits [work loss] were payable only to statutory survivors, requiring proof of dependency." Id.
at 767. The Kirsch court also restrictively interpreted the Heffner(Pontius) opinion as only
concluding that work loss benefits are available under the Act upon death of the insured. Id.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 172, 206-08.
260. See Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942).
261. This conclusion has been reached by the superior court. See, e.g., Sachritz v.
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins., 293 Pa. Super. 483, 484 n.1, 439 A.2d 678, 679 n.1
(1981) ("In Heffner, we held work loss benefits . . . recoverable by the survivors of a de-
ceased victim under the Act"). See also Wingeart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 449
A.2d 40 (Pa. Super 1982) (Heffner established that "survivors of deceased victims of vehicu-
lar accidents are entitled to recover work loss benefits").
262. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. See also Daniels v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 283 Pa. Super. 336, 423 A.2d 1284 (1980). In Daniels, the decedent's wife
instituted suit as an individual. The superior court held that Heflner(Pontius) did not actu-
ally create a new right to work loss benefits, nor redefine survivor's loss, but only specified
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preme court decision dealt almost exclusively with the right of an
individual to recover work loss benefits without even minimal at-
tention to the right of a decedent's estate to such recovery, the
basis for the supreme court affirming Pontius sub silentio re-
mained unclear. 8
Eventually, the superior court in Freeze and Chesler held that
an estate could recover work loss benefits, deciding that work loss
benefits are akin to Survival Act benefits and survivor loss benefits
closely related to wrongful death recovery. 264 The court believed
that these tort remedies remained even though the Act does not by
its language provide a right to benefits by a deceased victim, i.e., a
decedent's estate.268 However, doesn't the Act abolish tort reme-
dies, except for those exceptions listed in the section 301 threshold
requirements? 26' The Reimer superior court, with Judge Cercone
authoring the opinion as he did Freeze and Chesler, unequivocably
declared that the Act "explicitly abolished all causes of action fall-
ing within the ambit of the Act." 6 7 Yet, in the same year, Judge
Cercone relied on traditional tort system remedies expressed in the
Survival Act upon realizing that the Act did not provide for recov-
ery of work loss benefits by a decedent's estate.26 8 The Act sought
to provide stability and a forseeability of loss for a liability under-
writer.2 69 This goal is betrayed by the varying opinions.
Further inconsistencies have presented themselves. The Chesler
court engaged in a lengthy discussion surrounding the dependency
requirement contained in the definition of survivor in an attempt
to enable a mother to recover survivor's loss. 2 70 An insurer can only
be astounded by this digression, especially when it is realized that
the plaintiff was the decedent's estate, not the decedent's mother.
By relying on the preexisting Survival Act, the superior court ap-
that work loss benefits are a separate type of benefit from survivor's loss. Id. at 338, 423
A.2d at 1286-87. These work loss benefits were recoverable by the mother in her capacity as
the decedent's wife. Id.
263. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 216-39 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. Also, the title of Article II 'of the
Act specifically states that survivors and victims have a "right to benefits." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1009.201 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). A deceased victim is nowhere mentioned as
possessing a right to benefits.
266. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
267. 296 Pa. Super. at 209, 442 A.2d at 733.
268. Judge Cercone in Freeze found such a position "legislatively unintended." 447
A.2d at 1004 (quoting from his Hefiner analysis, 265 Pa. Super. at 193, 401 A.2d at 1165-66).
269. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102(a)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
270. 448 A.2d at 1083.
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parently decided that work loss benefits are recoverable by individ-
uals other than statutory survivors since an estate is not a survivor
under the Act's definitional section.
27 1
Conversely, in Wingeart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.,272 the superior court 273 construed the Heffner (Pon-
tius) supreme court decision to require establishment of survivor
status in order for a plaintiff to be entitled to recover work loss
benefits. 4 In Wingeart, the plaintiff was the decedent's estate.75
The superior court did not attempt to incorporate preexisting tort
remedies by references to the Survival Act as was done in Freeze
and Chesler.2 76 The court felt compelled to consider whether the
right of the estate to work loss benefits within the parameters of
the Act was intended by the legislature.2  Unfortunately, the court
concluded that an estate was a survivor under the Act.278 The Win-
geart court did not explain how it fit an "estate" into the statutory
list of survivors which includes: spouse, child, parent, brother, sis-
ter, or relative dependent upon the deceased for support.27 9 The
court mistakenly relied on Freeze and Chesler as support for its
finding that an estate was a survivor.28 In fact, while those cases
allowed an estate to recover work loss benefits, they did not rely on
any section of the Act for such a right and specifically did not hold
that a decedent's estate was a survivor as defined by the Act.
2 81
In light of these incompatible holdings, our discussion next must
consider who should be entitled to work loss benefits. The starting
point of this search for a coherent approach is the supreme court
decision in Heffner (Pontius). The debate in the supreme court
over the implications of this decision is not over yet.2 82 The fact
271. Id. at 1084.
272. 449 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. 1982).
273. The court was rostered by Judges Wieand, Price, and Lipez.
274. 449 A.2d at 41.
275. Id. at 40.
276. Id. at 41.
277. The insurer contended that a decedent's estate is not a survivor and, therefore, is
not entitled to recover work loss benefits under the No-fault Act. 449 A.2d at 41.
278. Id. The court cited Freeze and Chesler as having addressed this issue earlier. Id.
at 91.
279. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
280. 449 A.2d at 41. The court apparently believed that Freeze and Chesler had con-
cluded that an estate is a statutory survivor.
281. See supra notes 216-40 and accompanying text.
282. Other cases have recently allowed recovery of work loss benefits by an estate. See,
e.g., Ohrin v. Erie Ins. Exch., 453 A.2d 12 (Pa. Super. 1982); Tubner v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 1388 (Pa. Super. 1982); Beamsderfer v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 450
A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. 1982). See also Nye v. Erie Ins. Exch., 453 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super 1982);
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that the discussion by the supreme court was exclusively directed
to the right of a survivor to recover work loss benefits" ' weighs
heavily in favor of a conclusion that the decision's holding is solely
that work loss benefits can be collected only by those individuals
included in the definition of survivors in the No-fault Act.2 8 This
very conclusion was reached by the superior court in Wingeart.28 5
Under this approach, an estate would therefore have to be a
statutory survivor to recover work loss benefits. The dissenting
opinions of Judge Hester in Freeze and Chesler28' beckon like an
island of judicial clarity, attempting to reclaim lost territory from
an ever approaching sea of judicial illogic. Judge Hester interfaced
the Act's sections and the legislative dictates with the Heffner
(Pontius) decision in a most logical manner in Freeze.2 8 7 He recog-
nized that the supreme court held in Heffner (Pontius) that a sur-
Anfuso v. Erie Ins. Group, 452 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. 1982). The Shrager treatise points out
the error in attempting to analogize work loss benefits with survival act remedies and no-
fault survivor's loss with wrongful death act remedies, which is the basis for Freeze, ChesLer
and most decisions permitting recovery of work loss benefits by an estate, stating:
This approach would be erroneous . . . . The Wrongful Death Act incorporates by
reference the Intestate Act. Under the Intestate Act, a survivor is eligible to share in
the distribution if one member of his class (i.e., children of the decedent) was depen-
dent upon the decedent. Under the No-fault Act, relatives other than the spouse can
recover only if they, as individuals, can show dependency upon the deceased victim.
Also, the persons entitled to recover under the wrongful death statute are more strin-
gently limited than those eligible for survivors loss under the No-fault Act. Therefore,
it would be inappropriate to distribute survivors loss under the No-fault Act in the
same manner as provided in the wrongful death and intestacy statutes.
Shrager, supra note 12, at 102.
Shrager continues, considering whether traditional Survival Act remedies should be re-
coverable as work loss under the No-fault Act:
[T]he language of the Act has seemed to refute such an analysis. "Loss in income"
which would have been contributed by the decedent prior to death is encompassed by
the definition of survivor's loss. Also, the statute provides that survivor's loss shall be
paid for the "loss of income of a deceased victim which would probably have been
contributed to a survivor or survivors." The statutory definition of "work loss," how-
ever, provides for the recovery of "loss of gross income of a victim." The distinction
between "victim" and "deceased victim" in the statute has been urged as crucial.
Since work loss refers to loss of gross income of a victim, while survivor's loss is loss
of income of a deceased victim, they are mutually exclusive. Thus, it has been
claimed that the Act's black letter requires that survivor's loss be available for the
loss of income of deceased victim, whereas work loss is concerned with the loss of
income of one injured but not killed, so that a claim for the latter benefits is not
appropriate in the case where death resulted from the injury.
Shrager, supra note 12, at 104-105 (citations omitted) (emphasis in origial).
283. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
285. 449 A.2d at 41.
286. See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
287. 447 A.2d at 1005-09 (Hester, J., dissenting).
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vivor was entitled to recover work loss benefits.2"' He declared that
the supreme court therein made no statement that the estate of a
deceased victim is entitled to work loss benefits.28 9 Judge Hester
found this conclusion obvious because the Act makes no such pro-
vision for this recovery. 290 The legislative intent that only survivors
,recover for work loss is evident in the Act's statement of its pur-
pose: "Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Gen-
eral Assembly to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of
insurance, a statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss
benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of de-
ceased victims. 2 91 Work loss is a form of basic loss benefits. 29 2 An
estate is not a survivor. Any attempt to incorporate the preexisting
Survival Act, or expand the definition of survivor to include an es-
tate by the appellate courts symbolizes an attempt to amend the
Act. If an estate is ever to recover work loss benefits, the courts
must await legislative amendment of the Act to permit same.293
Until then, only survivors should be entitled to recover work loss
benefits with the application of the dependency requirements
2 94
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial interpretation of the No-fault Act created the confusion
in both issues raised by this comment. The Reimer decision cor-
rectly characterizes and utilizes the Act's purpose of compensating
injured parties. Virtually no conduct will be termed intentional for
purposes of escaping the tort abolition in section 301(a)(3) for one
obvious and essential reason: to brand an act causing the injury
288. Id. at 1006 (Hester, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1006-09 (Hester, J., dissenting).
291. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
292. Id. § 1009.202(b).
293. Judge Hester, noting that the Freeze majority attempts to expand the legislative
definition of survivor to include the estate of a deceased victim, commented on the role of
the judiciary:
We are often inclined to become "robed legislators." In the instant case, there is
no cause to inject the court into the role of the Legislature. The definition of "survi-
vor" in the statute is clear and precise.
In construing the provisions of the No-fault Act, we must be mindful of our obli-
gations to follow established rules of statutory construction under which we are not
permitted to disregard the clear and unambiguous language of the Act on the pretext
that its literal interpretation will frustrate its spirit.
447 A.2d at 1008 (Hester, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 1009 (Hester, J., dissenting).
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intentional removes it from the insurance coverage required under
section 104. This characterization, while permitting a tort claim
based on the section 301(a)(3) exclusion for intentionally inflicted
injuries, would conversely mandate as unreachable the only source
of funds available for compensation of the injured person when in-
jured by an intoxicated operator and, therefore, defeat the purpose
of the Act.2 95 All courts must be attentive to these far-reaching im-
plications. Compensation of the injured party must be permitted
whenever possible and may feasibly outweigh a determination of
liability. 26 Our system must be interpreted to serve the needs of
injured victims directly and foremost, rather than focus attention
on the conduct of the tortfeasor117 The Reimer verdict, in the long
run, performs this function by refusing to include gross negligence
as conduct falling within the section 301(a)(3) exception. 298 To
have permitted this action would potentially allow insurers to re-
fuse to provide first-party benefits to its insureds when injured by
an intoxicated operator. Such a result would be startling, tragic,
and obviously incompatible with the beneficial aims intended by
the General Assembly when the Act was passed. While public sen-
timent and outcry would appear to demand the imposition of puni-
tive damages, the courts must not supersede the clear directive of
the statute; insurance carriers shall not pay that portion of a judg-
ment consituting punitive damages.
The recent decisions pertaining to the recovery of work loss ben-
efits by a decedent's estate do not evince a similar clarity. The
court's analysis apparently attempts to compensate similarly, re-
gardless of whether the action is brought by the estate's represen-
tative or sought by an individual on his own behalf.2 99 As illus-
295. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.208(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) states that:
"An individual who intentionally injures himself or another individual is ineligible to receive
no-fault benefits for injury arising out of his acts." Id.
296. Professor Jaffe has commented that "the crucial controversy in personal injury
torts today is not in the area of liability but of damages. Questions of liability have great
doctrinal fascination. Questions of damage - and particularly their magnitude - do not
lend themselves so easily to discourse." Jaffe, supra note 2, at 221.
297. The only section in the Act which focuses on the conduct of the tortfeasor
removes the actor from the Act's coverage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.208(b)(1)(Purdon
Supp. 1982-1983) states that "an individual who intentionally injures himself or another
individual is ineligible to receive no-fault benefits for injury arising out of his acts, including
benefits otherwise due him as a survivor." Id.
298. 296 Pa. Super. 205, 217, 422 A.2d 731, 737.
299. It appeared that the superior court was finally prepared to address this criticism.
In Hiers v. Keystone Ins. Co., 454 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. 1982), the plaintiff was administra-
tor of his son's estate. The court addressed the "proper claimant issue." Id. at 135. The
Hiers court recognized that the issue of the distinction between an individual as a survivor
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trated, the decisions subsequent to Hefiner (Pontius), based upon
varying rationales, result in renewed uncertainty. Until appellate
courts determine the role of the section 103 definition of survivors
and provide on a sound legal foundation how an estate falls within
its ambit, any decision providing survivor's benefits to a decedent's
estate will appropriately receive resounding criticism because the
holdings now in force represent an attempt by the superior court
to amend the Act. Until this necessary dialogue occurs, insurers are
forced to engage in costly litigation. This result clearly betrays the
Act's purpose: to provide efficient compensation of motor vehicle
accident victims while avoiding confusion and uncertainty present
in the compensation system.
George N. Stewart
and the victim's estate had not been addressed. Id. The Hiers court also realized that the
issue of dependency had been left unresolved. Judge Johnson stated that, while the Freeze
court addressed the proper claimant issue, Freeze did not face the question whether the
plaintiff should recover work loss benefits since a father is a statutory survivor. Id. at 136.
The plaintiff was the decedent's estate. Id. The proper claimant issue was again decided
without determining if an estate is a no-fault survivor.
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